



This Bulletin appears while the world is absorbing the
'third oil shock' - this time a shock produced by a fall
of some two-thirds in the price of a barrel of crude oil,
and one which is producing a massive transfer of real
income back to oil consumers. The 1980s have also
witnessed persistently depressed prices for most metal
mineral commodities, after three decades in which
periodic booms encouraged a great acceleration of
exploration and production activity.2 For both energy
and mineral commodities fears of scarcity and
depletion have given place to the problems of glut.
The international concerns of earlier decades about
resource availability, price stabilisation schemes or the
conditions for foreign investment in minerals have
become less pressing. Instead, the focus of attention
has shifted towards the effects of mineral booms and
slumps upon the structure and welfare of the
economies and societies of producer countries. The
articles in this Bulletin address both national and
international concerns.
First come three articles [Evans; Jazayeri; Gelbi
dealing with aspects of the 'Dutch Disease' - the
boom-induced rise in the real exchange rate and
associated relative decline of non-mineral traded
goods industries - and what, in conditions of slump,
must now be termed inelegantly 'Reverse Dutch
Disease'.3 Next are two articles analysing the collapse
The editor acknowledges the support of ODA/ESCOR under
Research Scheme R3848 'Adjustment Problems of Mineral
Exporting Countries'. This Bulletin has been prepared concurrently
with the Final Report on the project, and addresses many of the
same issues. Neither the Overseas Development Administration nor
the Institute of Development Studies is responsible for the opinions
expressed.
2 Nor have producers of precious commodities been immune. The
price of gold quadrupled in 1979/80 only to collapse back to former
levels in real terms by mid-1982. The carefully controlled diamond
market temporarily collapsed in 198 1/82.
The term 'Dutch Disease' was coined lo describe the effects on the
Netherlands economy of the offshore gas discoveries in the late
l960s. The more neutral French term 'Syndrome Hollandais' leaves
open the question of whether it is a disease after all, and whether
special treatment is indicated [van Wijnbergen 19841.
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of earlier expectations for the evolution of metal
minerals markets: Phillip Crowson examines the
response of mtning companies, while Michael Prest
documents the remarkable default of the International
Tin Council (ITC) - an organisation which had once
held out the possibility of a successful international
mineral commodity agreement. Three country case
studies follow: first, Anthony Clunies Ross examines
the UK's response to the expansion of oil production
and shows that the dilemmas faced by mineral-
producers, and the mistakes made in tackling them,
are not only the province of developing countries.
Christopher Colciough and Martin Godfrey then
examine possible responses to what is probably the
key supply-side problem for oil-exporters - labour
shortage - using case studies from Brunei and two
Malaysian States in North Borneo. In the third, Carlos
Fortin considers the domestic and international
implications of Chile's counter-cyclical expansion of
copper production over the past decade. In a
concluding article, Mike Faber reviews recent
publications dealing with host country-foreign
investor relationships in mining, and with the
performance of state mining enterprises.
From different perspectives, these articles explore a
number of common themes. The experiences of
OPEC, the ITC, of CIPEC in earlier times and of the
failure ofUNCTAD's integrated programme initiatives
all illustrate the extreme difficulty of achieving any
sustained collective insulation of producers from
supply and demand conditions in international
markets.4 Moreover, movements in nominal prices
and real purchasing power of mineral exports have, tf
anything, become more difficult to predict; errors
caused by over-optimistic predictions have proved
particularly costly.
'Confirming the important hypotheses put forward ten years ago by
Radetzki (1976) about the limited potential for monopolistic
commodity pricing among mineral producers, and the likelihood
that OPEC's ability to manage supply would be over-estimated.
The articles suggest there is little inevitability about
the domestic impact of either booms or slumps.
'Adjustment' to a balance of payments surplus or
deficit in due course occurs by some means, but the
ultimate effect on economic structure or performance,
and on the distribution of income, is decisively
influenced by outcomes of government actions and
bureaucratic or political processes. A mineral boom is
neither an unalloyed blessing nor the cause of
inevitable economic and social decline. Intra-marginal
production and trade of minerals involves the
generation and distribution of economic rent. 'Rent' is
here used to mean returns to factors of production in
excess of those needed to secure their initial
commitment to the activity; the windfall gains that
accrue during minerals booms are rents par excel/ence.
From a welfare point of view potential rents can be
unrealised, diverted or dissipated5 depending upon the
terms governing mineral exploitation and the relative
strength of agents in the process. When rents are
generated and accrue to the resource-owning country,
the processes by which they are then allocated are
crucial to the long run equity and efficiency effects.
The explanatory power of any economic analysis of
mineral booms and slumps [see Evans, Jazayeri or
Gelb], is therefore contingent upon these processes.
Are Mineral-exporters Different?
The possibility of a 'life-cycle' for petroleum
economies was recognised in pioneering work by
Dudley Seers (1964, 1978): it implies not only the
obvious cycle of discovery, production and depletion,
but also the possibility that the wider economic
structure and performance will change markedly over
the cycle. More recently, the view has been advanced
that mineral exporters differ structurally from other
LDCs (including other primary exporting countries),
and that their development performance has fallen
behind countries, of similar initial income level, with a
different composition of production and trade
[Nankani 1979]. For sub-Saharan Africa, Wheeler
(1984:8-9) has suggested that the share of non-oil
minerals in total exports immediately after
Independence is an important factor in explaining
poor economic performance.
Three features strengthen the plausibility of the
argument. First, export earnings from minerals (as
from other primary commodities) are liable to wide
fluctuations. Second, mineral deposits are depleted
over time, creating a special requirement for
replacement sources of income. Third, production and
'Diversioif and dissipation' of mineral rents are concepts drawn
from Garnaut and Clunics Ross (1983:188). Diversion occurs when
part of the rent accrues to persons or organisations other than the
state. Dissipation occurs when the resource is exploited in an
economically inefficient manner.
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consumption linkages between mineral sectors and
other sectors are relatively tnstgnificant; the main
potential linkage is fiscal. Rent from mineral
extraction has first to be appropriated by the
government of the resource-owntng country, and then
allocated to other sectors by means of transfers,
provision of services or public investments.
Mineral-exporting countries, however, are a diverse
group. Among those for which fuels, metals and
minerals accounted for more than a quarter of exports
in recent years are a small number of low-income
countries (World Bank classifications) - Zatre,
Central African Republic, Sierra Leone and Guinea
and a much larger number of countries whose
'lower middle income' status is often attributable
more to mineral wealth than to broadly based income
generation among the populace. These include the
other African exporters of hard-rock and precious
minerals (Mauritania, Liberia, Zambta, Zimbabwe,
Botswana); a number of'high-absorbing' oil producers
with low incomes outside the oil sector (Indonesia,
Nigeria, Congo, Ecuador); and a varied group of more
diversified economies (Bolivia, Morocco, Papua New
Guinea, Cameroon, Peru, Tunisia). The 'upper middle
income' group includes the diversified economies of
Chile, Malaysia and Mexico, and five important oil
exporters. The 'capital surplus' oil exporters of the
Gulf remain. World Bank data exclude any centrally-
planned and non-member economies.
Nankani (1979) compared a set of fuel and non-fuel
mineral exporters with a control group of middle-
income non-mineral economies. While he found no
clear performance patterns within the mineral-
exporters' group, there was evidence of poorer
performance than the comparator group in a number
of respects. Non-fuel mineral economies had lower
incremental savings rates (although oil economies did
not). The mineral economies experienced greater
'technological dualism' (extremes of capital or labour
intensity in production), wider intersectoral wage-
differentials, higher unemployment and lower school
enrolment ratios. Inflation rates tended to be higher in
mineral economies. Agriculture tended to grow more
slowly, and food constituted a larger share of total
imports. Finally, he suggested that mineral economies
were in fact more prone to export earnings instability
than non-mineral economies, and their exports tended
to remain more concentrated.
Although this type of analysis can provide useful
pointers towards structural and policy problems in
mineral-exporting states, there are considerable
difficulties in arguing the strong thesis that mineral-
exporting economies as a group sisare common
characteristics, and a group performance record,
attributable to certain necessarily occurring con-
sequences of the development of a mineral-exporting
industry. Apart from the problems of data and
statistical manipulation involved in supporting such a
thesis, this analysis leaves out of account the political
economic characteristics of a country prior to the
advent of a mineral sector and the continuing role of
the pre-existing non-mineral sectors. There may be
very wide disparities in national average income per
head in different sectors of the economy, and little to
distinguish the non-mineral sectors from those of
other countries not possessing a mineral export sector
but possessing similar population, ecological or
historical characteristics. Thus a comparison of
selected indicators for mineral-exporting countries
with a control group of non-mineral exporters selected
by income level alone may not be a valid comparison
at all, since ceterisparibus conditions are most unlikely
to hold.
Furthermore (as Nankani points out), there are wide
disparities of performance among mineral exporters,
and there are no convenient measures of the 'room for
manoeuvre' available to governments in tackling the
constraints apparently imposed by the growth,
continuation or decline of a mineral export sector.
Hence it is unwise to assume any inevitability about
either the advantages or disadvantages brought by
mining. There is, however, a common set of strategic
and policy issues which mineral exporters face. It is,
therefore, worthwhile to examine the mechanisms by
which mineral development might incur national costs
and benefits, and the ways in which it might transform
a pre-existing economic structure.
The Costs and Benefits of Mineral
Development6
Economic theory has conventionally regarded the
expansion of exports, and inflow of foreign investment
to create export industries, as beneficial to any
individual economy. Export expansion is not
constrained by domestic market size, while the use of
domestic resources for export production, where this
follows comparative advantage (as it can be presumed
to do in the case of mineral exports), raises real income
by permitting the import of required commodities
from least-cost international sources. The gains from
trade are thus faster income growth and greater
efficiency in generating income from given domestic
resources.
The benefits of foreign investment have been
considered still greater: not only will the gains of
specialisation and comparative advantage accrue, but
investment in export expansion will also stimulate new
6 Useful surveys of earlier literature on trade, development and the
Impact of primary commodity export enclaves can be found in
Thoburn (1981) and Emerson (1982).
capital formation and technical change. In the
colonial era, primary export industries were presumed
to increase the propensity to save, and to stimulate
new tastes and aspirations by encouraging the import
of hitherto unknown commodities and services.
Following World War II, with the acceleration of
decolonisation and rise of economic nationalism, a
more critical set of arguments was developed.7 The
principal criticisms of orthodoxy were (a) that primary
export industries in LDCs tended to function as
enclaves with very limited linkages to other sectors of
the local economy, (b) that the resulting imports
tended to stifle local industry and prevent the
realisation of 'dynamic efficiency' gains from
industrialisation, while export industries drew scarce
capital and entrepreneurship away from production
for the domestic market, and (c) that, with foreign
investment, the potential gains from trade were
siphoned away from LDCs by structural features in
the operation of multinational firms and of
international commodity markets.8
The original use of these 'structuralist' arguments was
to justify a switch away from a development strategy
based upon the expansion of primary exports towards
a strategy of import-substituting industrialisation.
This emphasis on the general strategic alternative to
primary commodity exports to some extent obscured
the possibilities for overcoming the structural
obstacles to increasing retention of benefits from such
exports, even though the structuralist case pointed to
important problems. In the type of small economy
characteristic of most mineral exporters, particularly
in Africa, there have proved to be severe limits on the
potential for import-substituting industrialisation,
and thus a reappraisal of the mechanisms for deriving
benefits from mineral exports has been essential.
Moreover, the analysis and empirical generalisations
upon which both the earlier orthodoxy and the
structuralist critique rested tended to be of a partial
equilibrium kind - frequently in the strict sense that
everything else was held undisturbed while changes
within a single industry were analysed. Even where
earlier approaches tried to incorporate repercussion
effects on other markets, the picture of generality was
misleading. Early general equilibrium analyses treated
many elements (notably government) as exogenous,
These conflicting conceptions of the impact of trade and investment
in spreading or stunting the growth of capitalism are paralleled
within Marxist and related schools of thought; see Evans (1979) and
Warren (1973).
6The authors most commonly associated with these arguments are
Singer (1950), Prebisch, mainly in the documents of the UN
Economic Commission for Latin America, but also in Prebisch
(1963), and Mydral (1957). For a review of the origins of these
doctrines, see Singer (1984).
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tended to regard the institutional and organisational
framework as neutral, and did not fully recognise the
incompleteness of markets or the generality of
'second-best' problems.9
The upsurge of analytical effort that has accompanied
the two oil boomst° has shifted the focus of assessment
of mineral development towards two main areas. The
first can be termed the political economy of mineral
rent generation and distribution. The second covers
the general equilibrium effects of a minerals boom,
including the effects of the expenditure of mineral
rents." The articles in this Bulletin share these pre-
occupations, and some of them deal explicitly with the
methods of analysis that can be employed [see Evans,
Jazayeri, Gelb, Coiclough and Godfrey]. The authors
are also concerned to examine the robustness of the
new approaches in dealing with the conditions of
slump - for which they were not originally designed.
Structural Adjustment in Mineral Economies:
What has been learned?
The oil shocks of the 1970s led to the realisation in a
range of countries that the sudden expansion of one
(mineral) sector could cause rapid changes in resource
allocation that commonly involved the relative - or
even absolute - contraction of other traded goods
sectors (usually manufacturing, but, in an LDC
context, also agriculture), and the expansion of non-
traded sectors (construction, services). These shifts
were associated with price level rises faster than those
of trading partners, explained by a rise in the price of
non-traded output relative to traded - an appreciation
of the 'real' exchange rate. These structural changes
are not unique to mineral exporters: very large aid
inflows, or soft commodity price booms can bring
about similar effects. Nor is the problem new to
political economy: analysis of the 'transfer problem'
(war reparations, or the Marshall Plan) is in important
respects an antecedent of Dutch Disease analysis.
The framework within which this syndrome has come
to be analysed is discussed fully by Evans and Jazayeri
in this Bulletin. It uses a 'specific factors' model of an
economy engaged in international trade, with the
additional characteristic that it is 'dependent' - its
import and export prices are set by the international
am indebted to David Evans for this point. Modern general
equilibrium analysis in the neo-classical tradition explicitly tackles
these questions.
And similar local experiences such as the Australian mining boom
of the early 1970s (much of the important economic analysis of the
'Dutch Disease' in fact emerged in Australia), and the 1976/77
coffee boom in Colombia, Kenya or Ivory Coast [Dick el aI, 1983].
''Two recent volumes display the current state of work in each area:
on rents see Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983); on general
equilibrium analysis of the 'Dutch Disease' see Neary and van
Wijnbergen, eds. (1986).
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market. t2 There are two basic versions of the analysis.
In the first, the economy is simplified to two sectors,
traded and non-traded, and the minerals boom is
treated as a windfall increase in the economy's ability
to purchase imports [see, for example, Gelb, 1981].
This version permits a focus on the demand side, or
spending effects of a boom, and is useful where the
switch of scarce resources into minerals production
itself is not a major issue - as is often the case in
smaller developing economies. In the second, a
'booming' minerals sector is introduced, with its own
pattern of resource use. This permits interlocking
examination of spending and 'resource movement'
(supply side) effects [Corden and Neary, 1982].
The standard analysis usually begins with the
assumption that there are no idle domestic resources,
and that the external accounts are in balance. The
spending effect of a boom (the overall rise in public and
private expenditure permitted by the windfall foreign
exchange gain) immediately raises the prices of those
goods and services that can only be supplied from
domestic resources (non-traded), while increased
demand for lagging sector output can be met from
imports whose prices are internationally determined.
This 'real' appreciation of the exchange rate causes a
flow of labour out of agriculture and manufacturing
(traded sectors), and a relative reduction in output in
those sectors. The extent of the effect depends on the
propensity to consume services; in mineral-exporting
LDCs where increased government spending on
construction and public services is likely to be the
main channel for use of mineral rents, the marginal
propensity will be high.
The supply side, or resource movement effect occurs
because employment of additional workers in the
booming sector now produces more output than
employment of the same workers in other sectors. A
withdrawal of workers from service industries causes
prices to rise at any given level of demand, while
imports again fill the gap in other traded goods
sectors. The end result is an effect similar to that of the
spending effect. The strength of the supply side impact
depends on the relative use in each sector of labour
and other productive resources - where the booming
mineral sector uses relatively little mobile labour (as
may well be the case in some LDCs) the resource
movement effect may be dwarfed by the spending
effect.
'Specific factors' means that some factors of production (capital, for
example, or a natural resource) are specific to one sector, and not
useable in others. The basic Dutch Disease analysis usually assumes
specific and immobile capital, hut mobile labour. The 'dependent
economy' assumption also implies that the relative prices of imports
and exports cannot be altered by domestic policy action; hence
imports and exports can be treated as a single, composite 'traded'
commodity.
Given the assumptions, a mineral boom brings about
a rise in real income, a contraction of the lagging
sector, and probably an expansion in non-traded
goods production. Hence the possibility of 'de-
industrialisation' in economies such as those of the
UK, Netherlands or Norway [Clunies Ross], and of
the squeeze on agriculture or 'perverse re-industriali-
sation' [Jazayeri] in LDCs. Wage-price flexibility, and
labour mobility, ensure that there is no unemployment.
When the boom subsides (or collapses) the process
should then reverse itself - again without un-
employment (since wages fall, and the real exchange
rate depreciates). Real income will now be dependent
on the choices between consumption and accumulation
made during the boom, and the efficiency of
investment undertaken.
It will be obvious that much of the story is not like this
- but 'Dutch Disease' economics can be helpful in
identifying the potential direction of structural
change, and the reasons why, in both boom and
slump, it does not necessarily occur as the model
predicts.
The problems encountered with the familiar 'Dutch
Disease' model command a good deal of attention in
this Bulletin. The main ones concern the assumptions
and include: the initial assumption of full employment
[Evans] and external balance [Gelb]; price/wage
flexibility and the possibility of a smooth adjustment
process from one production structure to another; the
absence of market distortions; and the 'specific
factors' assumption that capital does not move
between sectors. The removal of the latter restriction
[Evans] adds a degree of room for manoeuvre in
dealing with reverse Dutch Disease not so readily
apparent in the standard version of the model.
Moreover, as all the authors stress, the outcomes of
both booms and slumps depend on things that
governments do, and thus upon the political process.
If there were widespread unemployment, production
of minerals and services could expand without
withdrawing resources from manufacturing or agri-
culture. But all too often this has not been the case.
Whether for institutional reasons or because the
'subsistence-wage' floor is high, mineral booms have
still produced rapidly rising wages and real exchange
rate appreciation even where unemployment appears
to be significant.
Labour market conditions are crucial to any possible
reversal of the effects of the boom when mineral
receipts contract [Evans; Gelb; Clunies Ross;
Coiclough and Godfrey]. A combination of strong
unions in the leading sector, and in the public sector,
with widespread government-administered wage-
fixing (all of which may be strengthened during the
boom) will stand in the way of a significant reduction
in the relative price of home goods and services -
meaning that real depreciation will be hard to achieve
whatever nominal exchange rate action is taken.
Hence the likelihood of long-duration unemployment
during contraction.
Colclough and Godfrey examine the import of labour
in North Borneo states as one solution to general
labour shortage and the resource movement effect.
The Nigerian case [Jazayeri; Gelb] also affords an
example of where the import of labour was used to
help meet booming demand for construction and
services. When the boom collapsed, the expulsion of
imported labour followed. Refugee problems are not
always the product of wars and famines.
Import barriers will alter the distribution of the effects
of real appreciation, and narrow the range of domestic
traded activities. Protection of domestic manu-
facturing, for example, may mitigate its relative
contraction, but also increase the weight of non-
traded activities in the economy and the pace of cost
inflation.
Once again, the problem occurs when the boom is
over. If protection and regulation have been used to a
large extent, non-mineral traded goods production
will have contracted sharply. In these circumstances,
new exports are slow to emerge, and the economy
faces a doubly acute foreign exchange shortage.
Nominal exchange rate devaluation here will improve
the local currency prices of exports relative to imports
if prices of imports (and domestic substitutes) are
already set by supply and demand in domestic
markets, whereas exporters receive only the local
currency proceeds of export earnings at official
exchange rates - imports and exports can no longer
be treated as the products of a composite 'traded'
sector.
Clunies Ross offers a useful distinction between those
countries where the main problem is managing the
appreciation of the real exchange rate and its effects,
and those countries where managing public finances
presents the main challenge. The actions of
government are critical in both, butin the former they
intensify or moderate the supply side effects, in the
latter the demand side effects.
Clunies Ross argues that the British Government
declined to 'lean against the wind' in its management
of sterling's appreciation, and thus substantially
magnified the damage to manufacturing experienced
during the oil boom. Real exchange rate appreciation
has been pronounced, too, in many mineral-exporting
LDCs, but more frequently it has been a repercussion
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of mismanagement in public finances and expenditure
allocation.
When governments rapidly increase spending in
response to a mineral boom, they are likely to exhaust
the range of high-yielding, quick-implementation
projects in a very short time, and to run into capacity
constraints)3 Fiscal discipline over both expenditure
and revenue-raising often becomes an early casualty.
Large, lumpy infrastructure projects making heavy
demands on future recurrent spending tend to be
chosen. Rapid increases in public investment and
consumption make wage restraint difficult to sustain,
while import of foreign skills adds to wage pressure
through a demonstration effect. The boom itself may
stimulate further capital inflows, and the new activity
adds further to government revenue from duties, sales
taxes and income tax.
Nor is direct transfer of resources to the private sector
- reducing taxes, or offering subsidies - necessarily
an answer. Much depends upon the regulatory
environment and the structure of incentives facing
private business. There are often quick and very large
returns to be made, for example, in real estate. Above
all, a concentration of private effort upon securing a
share of windfall rents directly from government may
be much more rewarding than investment in
productive capacity [Krueger 1974]. Each of these
effects further weakens the economy in the face of a
subsequent slump.
Current spending obligations are difficult to reduce,
once undertaken. Alternative traded goods production
will have been weakened both by market forces and
government allocation decisions. Public sector savings
performance may deteriorate very quickly indeed. The
temptation to resort to government borrowing from
the Central Bank has proved widely irresistible.
Foreign exchange reserves then fall more rapidly still,
and resort to tight trade, exchange and price controls
follows. These in turn narrow the scope of traded
goods production and prevent the real exchange rate
from depreciating as required.
Access to benefits from increased public expenditure,
and competition for a share of rents (mineral,
monopoly or regulatory) easily become the central
political questions in a minerals boom. If many of the
patterns analysed in this Bulletin take hold, a mineral
boom in an LDC can be viewed as a special case of a
mechanism by which 'urban bias' is installed.i4
° Full discussion of these points can be found in Gelb (1981), Lewis
(1984), Garnaut and Clunies Ross (1983:192-212) and Roemer
(1985).
4 By 'urban bias' is meant the syndrome of systematic discrimination
in pricing and resource allocation in favour of urban interests
elaborated by Lipton (1977).
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Profits, wages and employment opportunities in
urban services expand faster than their counterparts in
rural production. Agriculture easily becomes a
'lagging' traded sector, and receives low priority in
public investment; it is less able than urban
manufacturing to achieve sheltered (non-traded)
status through protection. Capacity constraints and
wage pressure increase the costs of public sector,
industrial and other service activities, while budget
laxity allows proliferation of civil service posts. Very
large scarcity rents become available to those with
control over resources in non-traded activities
(housing or land, for example); rents also become
available to those able to clear obstacles to obtaining
the contracts or licences necessary for participation in
the construction and services boom.
There may be powerful reasons why governments,
ostensibly representing the collective interest, fail to
prevent these developments and prove unable to 'lean
against the wind' in the conduct of economic policy.
The task of coping with a mineral boom (or slump) is
not only a matter of seeking the best (or even a slightly
improved) policy package from an economic efficiency
point of view. It also requires the construction of a
coalition of political forces that perceives a sufficiently
strong interest in avoiding the Dutch Disease, and has
sufficient resources at its command to 'buy-off' the
key elements among those who might suspect damage
to their own interests from an adjustment programme.
Bates (1981, 1983) has cogently argued the political
rationality of economically irrational (and
inegalitarian) agricultural policies in the context of
sub-Saharan Africa. The argument can help in
understanding the nature of political responses to the
economic effects of a mineral boom. The coalition
which exerts the strongest influence for higher prices,
and for command of public resources, will tend to
contain producers of goods with low weights in
consumers' expenditure, and those strategically
placed to disrupt economic activity or national
security. The incentive to act to increase a price or
secure a public subsidy is greater where there are few
sellers or beneficiaries, each anticipating a large share
of the benefit. In agricultural, or small-scale
enterprise, in poor countries, the costs of collective
effort may be substantial, difficult to apportion, and,
for some producers, outweigh any expected benefits.
Mineral rents provide the resources par excellence for
the use of project-based, rather than price-based,
measures to provide benefits to selected groups in the
rural population, and to subsidise the key consumer
items for the poorer sections of the urban population
- thus maintaining in force policies that violate the
interests of most farmers and the prospects of those
who will be excluded from subsidy at the onset of
slump. The availability of rents in the boom eases the
cost of generating additional rents through physical
controls and administered pricing distortions, and
increases the necessity to maintain them as the
downturn occurs, so that resources are at the
disposition of politicians and officials, for use in
selectively acquiring political support or acquiescence.
The structure of the dominant coalition and its
expectation of its own durability, is likely to influence
the feasible stance on stabilisation policy, incentives
and expenditure allocation. Where for reasons of pre-
boom political structure, or because the minerals
boom is not of sufficient relative size to threaten the
continuing significance of other exporting sectors,
prosperous rural interests have a strong voice in
government, there are signs that the Dutch Disease
has been better contained. The editor's own research
suggests this for Botswana and Papua New Guinea
(contrast Zambia), it may be the case for Malaysia and
Cameroon, and emerges to some extent for Indonesia
in contrast with the other cases examined by Gelb in
this Bulletin.
Policy Responses and the Future
The outlook for international mineral markets
portrayed by Crowson offers little hope of a sustained
rise in the purchasing power of metal mineral exports.
Although excess production capacity is gradually
being reduced, the growth of demand is not such as to
foreshadow the re-emergence of conditions of
scarcity. Energy minerals are now experiencing similar
effects, coupled with the collapse of OPEC's price-
supporting production restraint. Long-run market
conditions do not eliminate the possibility of
occasional short-lived booms in individual com-
modities, but should make exporters all the more wary
of the durability of sudden price rises. Across the
whole spectrum of commodities the task has reverted
to one of dealing with price fluctuations, rather than
major 'permanent' re-evaluations of the relative price
of a commodity. Above all, however, uncertainty has
increased [Gelb; Prest] - not least because the
liberalisation of financial markets in the rich world is
unleashing speculative forces which existing com-
modity trading arrangements are finding it difficult to
contain. The amplitude of fluctuations, and the long-
run average around which they occur, are thus more
difficult than ever to forecast.
Collective action by mineral exporters to preserve
their real incomes looks to be a less promising route
than ever before - though the outcome of OPEC's
effort to regain its share of the world oil market
remains to be discerned and evaluated.
proposition from different perspectives. Prest's article
also drives home the point that very demanding
conditions have to be met if producer-consumer
commodity price stabilisation agreements are to
survive; recent theoretical work has in any case cast
doubt on the micro-economic benefits of dampening
price fluctuations [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981].
The review article by Faber (and Clunies Ross'
account of UK oil taxation) suggest, too, that
measures prompted by economic nationalism have
run their course in improving LDCs' shares of mineral
export proceeds. Nationalisation has waned in
popularity, and the scope for new state enterprises is
limited in a depressed market. Most of the glaring
examples of concession agreements favouring foreign
companies have been successfully re-negotiated.
Mineral taxation devices have become steadily more
sophisticated and attuned to the economic problem of
efficient extraction for the host government of mineral
rent. In a telling phrase, 'the sting has gone out of the
relationship' between foreign mining or oil companies
and host governments.'5
The task for mineral exporters, then, is the tough one
of adjusting to circumstances that represent the
collapse of expectations that once seemed well-
justified. In important respects, this endeavour does
not differ from that facing other non-NIC poor
countries, but it is confronted from an even greater
collapse of expectations and from economic structures
already weakened by mishandling of earlier booms.
If, however, early booms produced a 'disease', then
the slump may contain possibilities for a long-term
cure [Evans]. The fall in rents on minerals, and on
specific resources in non-traded sectors, reduces the
scope for rent-seeking activity and will encourage real
depreciation. New opportunities for import sub-
stitution and exports could be opened up by real wage
reduction, technical change, and better use of
domestic resources - provided that the likely
resistance of rent-beneficiaries to relative price and to
resource allocation changes is overcome.
Both existing and potential mineral-exporters now
have a wide range of positive and negative experiences
to draw upon in managing the rapid expansion of a
mineral sector. It is tempting to hope, with Roemer
(1985) that the experience of mismanaged booms has
been so disastrous as to frighten future rulers into
avoiding the same mistakes.
The main lessons are as aptly summarised for the UK
by Clunies Ross as for any LDC. There has to be an
Fortin (copper) and Prest (tin) illustrate this '5The phrase was used by Roland Brown in a seminar at the IDS in1983.
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attempt to estimate 'permanent revenue' from mineral
resources, and to match 'permanent expenditure' to it.
This implies the accumulation of foreign financial
assets in boom times, to run them down in slumps.
Coherent stabilisation policy requires discipline, 'best
guesses' and a mixture of provision against what is
likely to happen and response to what has happened.
But without it there is little hope of mitigating real
exchange rate appreciation, spending in line with the
absorptive capacity of the economy, or deploying
mineral rents in ways that are even close to full
potential efficiency.
There are three aspects to the overall resource
judgement which a government has to make for
macroeconomic policy purposes. First, the cyclical
judgement - exemplified by the problems of
managing the soft commodity price cycles that became
familiar in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. The second is
the precautionary aspect, exemplified by Botswana's
accumulation of reserves against a possible collapse in
the diamond market. The third is the counter-
depletionary problem, represented by the problem of
re-investment of oil or mineral revenues to create new
assets.
The first, cyclical, area, requires a judgement about
the duration and intensity of the cycle, and forecasts of
trend values across cycles. The second requires some
assessment of the degree of risk acceptable to the
domestic economy, and the risk of major structural
change in the world environment. The third requires
some estimate of depletion rates, of the absorptive
capacity that might be set against the investment of the
depleting resource and of the yield on investments.
While it would be utopian to expect accurate foresight
on such matters, it is not so to suggest that the
problems at least be posed when fiscal policy
judgements are at stake.
Each country study in this Bulletin emphasises the
importance of real wage levels and the real exchange
rate. There is now widespread recognition that
deceleration of the pace of real appreciation in a boom
(or offsetting its effects by subsidy) can help to prevent
the contraction of other traded activities. But some
degree of real appreciation is necessary to balance of
payments adjustment in a boom, where domestic
resources are already fully employed, unless the whole
additional foreign exchange inflow is somehow
'sterilised' (for example, by holding it in Central Bank
accounts off-shore). The problem is how to reverse it
when slump conditions require. Nominal devaluations
work only to the extent that domestic costs, especially
wages, do not rise with import prices. Whether wages
are best stabilised, and adjusted where necessary, by
'labour market flexibility' or by a process of national
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consensus formation akin to an incomes policy is a
question without a definitive answer.
Perhaps the most difficult question is that raised by
Gelb - what is the best way to 'sow the oil', and what
is the preferred balance of public and private activity
in the process. The record of public expenditure in
mineral booms leaves few grounds for confidence
about the effectiveness of the 'developmental state' in
mineral-exporting countries. But given that mineral
rents in LDCs will accrue, if at all, to the state rather
than private (citizen) agents, there is little alternative
but to improve the allocative process rather than
repose faith in widespread privatisation. Non-mineral
tax effort may tend to weaken, but few governments
- other than the State of Alaska - have directly
distributed oil revenues to the populace.
References
Bates, Robert H., 1981, Markets and Stales in Tropical Africa,
University of California Press, Berkeley
1983, Essays on the PoliticalEconomy ofRural Africa, CUP
Corden, W. M. and J. P. Neary, 1982, 'Booming sector and
deindustrialisation in a small open economy', Economic
Journal, 92, December, pp825-48
Dick, H., S. Gupta, T. Mayer and D. Vincent, 1983, 'The
short-run impact of fluctuating primary commodity
prices on three developing economies: Colombia, Ivory
Coast and Kenya', World Development, vol 11 noS, May,
pp405-l6
Emerson, Craig, 1982, 'Mining enclaves and taxation', World
Development, vol 10 no 7, July, pp561-71
Evans, David, 1979, 'International commodity policy:
UNCTAD and NIEO in search of a rationale', World
Development, vol 7 no 3
Garnaut, Ross and Anthony Clunies Ross, 1983, Taxation of
Mineral Rents, Clarendon Press, Oxford
Gelb, Alan H., 1981, 'Capital-importing oil exporters:
adjustment issues and policy choices', World Bank Staff
Working Paper no 475, August
Krueger, Anne 0., 1974, 'The political economy of the rent-
seeking society, American Economic Review, vol 64, no 3,
pp 291-301
Lewis, Stephen R., 1984, Development problems of the
mineral-rich countries' in M. Syrquin, L. Taylor and
L. E. Westphal (eds.), Economic Structure andPeíformance:
Essays in Honour of Hollis B. Chenery, Academic Press,
San Diego
Lipton, Michael, 1977, Why Poor People Stay Poor, Temple
Smith, London
Myrdal, Gunnar, 1957, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped
Regions, Duckworth, London
Nankani, Gobind, 1979, 'Development problems of mineral
exporting countries', World Bank Staff Working Paper,
no 354, August
Neary, J. P. and S. van Wijnbergen (eds.), 1986, Natural
Resources and the Macroeconomy, Blackwell, Oxford
Newbery, D. M. G. and J. E. Stiglitz, 1981, The Theory of
Commodity Price Stabilisation, OUP
Prebisch, R., 1963, Towards a Dynamic Development Policy
for Latin America, UN, New York
Radetzki, Manan, 1976, 'The potential for monopolistic
commodity pricing by developing countries' in G. K.
Helleiner (cd.), A World Divided, CUP
Roemer, Michael, 1985, 'Dutch Disease in developing
countries: swallowing bitter medicine', in Mats Lundahl
(cd.), The Primary Sector in Economic Development,
Croom Helm, London
Seers, Dudley, 1964, 'The mechanism of an open petroleum
economy', Yale University Economic Growth Center Paper
n°47
1978, 'The life cycle of a petroleum economy', Discussion
Paper no 139, IDS, Sussex, September
Singer, Hans W., 1950, 'The distribution of gains between
investing and borrowing countries', American Economic
Revie%s', Papers and Proceedings, May
1984, 'Terms of trade controversy and the evolution of
soft financing: early years in the UN 1947-51' in Gerald M.
Meier and Dudley Seers (eds.), Pioneers in Development,
Oxford University Press for the World Bank
Thoburn, John, 1981, Multinationals, Mining and Develop-
ment: A Study of the Tin Industry, Gower, Fannborough
van Wijnbergen, S., 1984, 'The "Dutch Disease": a disease
after all?', Economic Journal, 94, March, pp41-55
Warren, Bill, 1973, 'Imperialism and capitalist indust-
rialisation', New Left Review, no 81
Wheeler, David, 1984, 'Sources of stagnation in sub-Saharan
Africa', WorldDevelopment, vol 12 no 1, January, pp1-23
9
